Elements of the Prospect Theory in Strategic Investment Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1733-2842,2300-4460
DOI: 10.18276/frfu.2015.74/1-37