Electricity pricing and market power-evidence from Germany

Electricity pricing and market power : Evidence from Germany

The aim of this paper is to develop a methodology for measuring the exercise of potential market power in liberalized electricity markets. We therefore investigate producer behavior in the context of electricity pricing with respect to fundamental time-dependent marginal cost (TMC), i.e. CO2and fuel cost. In doing so, we do not in contrast to most current approaches to market power investigatio...

Understanding Competitive Pricing and Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets

In the ̄rst year of the deregulated California electricity market, a number of issues have arisen that relate to the competitiveness of the wholesale electricity market in the state. There have been lively debates over the need for price caps in the California Power Exchange (PX) day-ahead market and the California Independent System Operator's (ISO) real-time and ancillary services markets. The...

The market value and impact of offshore wind on the electricity spot market: Evidence from Germany

Although the expansion of offshore wind has recently increased in Germany, as in other countries, it is still forced to defend its role in long-term energy policy plans, particularly against its onshore counterpart, to secure future expansion targets and financial support. The objective of this article is to investigate the economic effects of offshore wind on the electricity spot market and th...

Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing

This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction with discriminatory midpoint pricing. Buyers and sellers use a modified Roth–Erev individual reinforc...

Strategic pricing, market entry and competition: Evidence from German electricity submarkets