Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.001