Electoral Competition between Social Democracy and the Populist Radical Right: How Welfare Regimes Shape Electoral Outcomes

نویسندگان

چکیده

This study examines how the growing competition over immigration and welfare between social democratic parties populist radical right impacts electoral outcomes. The argues that historical legacies of conservative regimes influence voters respond to this competitive struggle. findings support argument. In regime, gain more when they compete welfare, although Nordic can mitigate trend by appearing tough on immigration. However, parties’ emphasis is main source mobilization, particularly among with anti-immigration sentiments. dynamic less connected immigration, discourse appeals primarily economically vulnerable voters, while lose votes taking a strict stance These results have important implications suggest shape voting behaviour differently today than in previous eras.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Political Studies

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1467-9248', '0032-3217']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231173399