Elections, Political Polarization, and Economic Uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Inflation, Inflation Uncertainty, Political Stability, and Economic Growth
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3708443