Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group strategyproofness in queueing models
We examine the tradeoffs between two variants of group strategyproofness, efficiency and budget balance in queueing models. In general, group strategyproofness is incompatible with efficiency and budget balance. Weakening budget balance to feasibility, we show that the incompatibility persists with strong group strategyproofness. We then identify a necessary condition for weak group strategypro...
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When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable wherea...
متن کاملTitle Egalitarian - Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences
When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable wherea...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0793-8