Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points
We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate an ex ante efficiency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generalizations of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields a subclass of these solutions. B...
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Prominent bargaining solutions are disagreement-point monotonic. These solutions’ disagreement-point monotonicity ranking, on the other hand, is impossible to establish. In a large class of bargaining problems, however, a ranking of the relative disagreement-point monotonicity of these prominent bargaining solutions can be obtained. Using the ‘Constant Elasticity of Substitution’ class of barga...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100124