منابع مشابه
Sequential bargaining mechanisms
A fundamental problem in economics is determining how agreements are reached in situations where the parties have some market power. Of particular interest are questions of efficiency and distribution: • How efficient is the agreement? • How can efficiency be improved? • How are the gains from agreement divided among the parties? Here, I explore these questions in the context of bilateral monop...
متن کاملSequential bargaining and competition^
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralised market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our results are as follows. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, frictionless markets need not be Walra...
متن کاملSequential share bargaining
This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-St̊ahl bargaining model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players’ shares in the cake are determined sequentially. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to be implemented. Unlike all existing bargaining protocols ...
متن کاملIterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining
A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated ...
متن کاملSequential bargaining with common values∗
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect B...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2298066