منابع مشابه
Efficient bidding with externalities
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities....
متن کاملBidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities
We study a coalition formation game with externalities where each agent’s payoff depends on the entire partition (see, e.g., Bloch (1996)). As in Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), we assume that coalitions form sequentially and once a coalition forms, it cannot dissolve nor can its members forge new coalitions with the rest of the agents. However, instead of an exogenously given protocol, ...
متن کاملPricing Externalities in Real-Time Bidding Markets
Online publishers rely on real-time bidding (RTB) markets to sell their remnant inventory and increasingly to command higher prices for “premium” content. However, content providers have lagged advertisers historically in the sophistication of their pricing models, as evidenced by the large increase in demand-side platforms without corresponding investment on the sell-side. Informed advertisers...
متن کاملCombinatorial Auctions with Externalities: Basic Properties and Bidding Languages
Although combinatorial auctions have received a great deal of attention from the computer science community over the past decade, research in this domain has focused on settings in which a bidder only has preferences over the bundles of goods they themselves receive, and is indifferent about how other goods are allocated to other bidders. In general, however, bidders in combinatorial auctions w...
متن کاملBidding More Aggressively or Free Riding? Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities
This paper studies negative externalitiese¤ect on bidding strategy and auction outcome. We use a model of one special bidder and two regular bidders, where if the special bidder wins, both regular bidders incur a loss; otherwise, the two losing bidders receive zero payo¤s. Applying the model to an ascending clock auction, regular bidders are shown to bid less aggressively and drop out before r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.002