Efficient allocations with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending: A recursive formulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Dynamics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1094-2025
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2008.05.001