Efficient allocations under ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient allocations under ambiguity
An important implication of the expected utility model under risk aversion is that if agents have the same probability belief, then the efficient allocations under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the efficient allocations are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocatio...
متن کاملEfficient Construction of Underspecified Semantics under Massive Ambiguity
We investigate the problem of determining a compact underspecified semantical representation for sentences that may be highly ambiguous. Due to combinatorial explosion, the naive method of building semantics for the different syntactic readings independently is prohibitive. We present a method that takes as input a syntactic parse forest with associated constraintbased semantic construction rul...
متن کاملEfficient Construction of Underspecified Semantics under Massive Ambiguity
We investigate the problem of determining a compact underspecified semantical representation for sentences that may be highly ambiguous. Due to combinatorial explosion, the naive method of building semantics for the different syntactic readings independently is prohibitive. We present a method that takes as input a syntactic parse forest with associated constraintbased semantic construction rul...
متن کاملCampaign Allocations Under Probabilistic Voting
We develop a non-Downsian probalistic voting model where candidates compete by running campaign ads in different media markets. Ads are viewed by everyone within a media market and cannot be targeted to subgroups such as undecided voters or partisans of one candidate. Based on observable factors, candidates can estimate the distribution of voter preference intensities in a media market, and cam...
متن کاملImplementation of Pareto Efficient Allocations ∗
This paper considers Nash implementation and double implementation of Pareto efficient allocations for production economies. We allow production sets and preferences are unknown to the planner. We present a well-behaved mechanism that fully implements Pareto efficient allocations in Nash equilibrium. The mechanism then is modified to fully doubly implement Pareto efficient allocations in Nash a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.04.002