Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation

Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation

We study a T -period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent if he performs poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past, and, at the same time, the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor performance in the past by performing better in the future. Thus, optimal incen...

Wage Differentials in Experimental Efficiency Wage Markets

In recent years, many econometric studies have confirmed the existence of inter-industry wage differentials. Even after controlling for a large number of joband worker related characteristics, and demographic variables, large and statistically significant industry wage differences remain. Moreover, these differences exist for union as well as for non-union workers and seem to be remarkably simi...

Partial Evaluation for Hierarchies of Logic Theories

We discuss the impact of Partial Evaluation within the framework of structured logic programming. We define a general scheme for Partial Evaluation to be applied to a wide class of structuring policies for logic programming, capable of supporting both blockand inheritancebased systems. We show how the properties of soundness and completeness of Partial Evaluation in Logic Programming are preser...

Test Of Efficiency- Wage Model For Iran's Economy

Wage discrimination and partial compliance with the minimum wage law

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the discriminatory behavior of a non-complying firm in a minimum-wage economy. In the analysis, the violating firm pays one “favored” group of workers the statutory minimum and the other “non-favored” group of workers a sub-minimum. We find conditions under which law enforcement is ineffective in improving the between-group wage differentials. ...