Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
In this report, we summarize the paper by Ramesh Johari and John Tsitsiklis [1]. This paper considers the problem of distributed resource allocation mechanisms for the Internet. The current Internet is used widely by a heterogenous population of users. Different users place different values on the perceived network performance. Moreover there are some fundamental constraints on the maximum rate...
متن کاملNetwork Resource Allocation and A Congestion Game
We explore the properties of a congestion game where users of a congested resource anticipate the effect of their actions on the price of the resource. When users are sharing a single resource, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and establish that the aggregate utility received by the users is at least 3/4 of the maximum possible aggregate utility. We also consider extens...
متن کاملAllocation efficiency in network DEA
The present study is an attempt towards remodeling cost, revenue and profit relationship within the network process. The previous models of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) have been too general in their scope and focused on the input and the output within a black box system, therefore they have not been able to measure various phases simultaneously within a network system. By using these mod...
متن کاملEfficiency loss in market mechanisms for resource allocation
This thesis addresses a problem at the nexus of engineering, computer science, and economics: in large scale, decentralized systems, how can we efficiently allocate scarce resources among competing interests? On one hand, constraints are imposed on the system designer by the inherent architecture of any large scale system. These constraints are counterbalanced by the need to design mechanisms t...
متن کاملAllocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game
We consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry: unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules. Only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency; in other cases, the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific. We...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1040.0091