Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining Author(s):

E ciency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing e ciency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it di ers from e ciency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form. We...

Marriage Markets and Bargaining Marriage Markets and Bargaining Between Spouses

Repeated reputational bargaining with deadlines

We develop a two-sided reputational bargaining model with deadlines, and analyze the implications of linking a reputation for commitment on one bargaining issue, to reputation on future issues. The model is adapted from that of Abreu and Gul [2000], where some agents are committed to achieving a fixed share of any surplus available. Among the conclusions drawn are: the ordering of issues on the...

Repeated bargaining

Two symmetric players bargain over an infinite stream of pies. There is one exogenously given pie in every period, whose size is stochastic, and the pies are iid. Play can be in a tabula rasa mode or dispute mode. When it is in the former, Nature selects a proposer and a responder with equal probabilities, and a proposal is made by the proposer regarding the division of the present pie. If ther...