Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency and Observability with Long-run and Short-run Players
We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as 5 -> 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and shortrun players, allowing for the possibility that the players' actions are not observable by their opponents. We illustrate the algorithm with two economic examples. In a simple partnership we show how to compute the equilibrium payoffs when...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1006