Effects of take-back legislation on pricing and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This study investigates the effects of take-back legislation and channel structures on pricing, collection, coordination in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). By establishing centralized, manufacturer-led, retailer-led CLSC models, we analyze equilibrium solutions players government. We obtain following results. (1) The manufacturer can accept higher collection target exit market later centralized model than decentralized decision-making models. Moreover, exists earlier with regulation compared manufacturer-led model. (2) government's optimal is same under models when comes into force. (3) Revenue-sharing two-part tariff contracts effectively coordinate CLSCs legislation. Finally, conduct several numerical examples relevant managerial insights. Our results indicate that correlation between structure has significant impact pricing decisions CLSC; furthermore, government should flexibly set facing different power CLSC.</p>