Effects of Moral Hazard and Private Information on Investment Timing: An Auction Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring
We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can di er from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the sender does not observe the quality of good received and the receiver does not observe the quality despatched, we have a repeated game with with imperfect monitoring by private signals. The stage game ha...
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this study compared the different effects of form-focused guided planning vs. meaning-focused guided planning on iranian pre-intermediate students’ task performance. the study lasted for three weeks and concentrated on eight english structures. forty five pre-intermediate iranian students were randomly assigned to three groups of guided planning focus-on-form group (gpfg), guided planning focus...
15 صفحه اولInvestment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard
In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidatio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.964907