Effects of Asymmetric Payoffs and Information Cost in Sequential Information Revelation Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs
Players bargained over chips with different exchange rates and with different information regarding these exchange rates. Offers generally reflected a self-serving definition of fairness. There is ample evidence that relative income shares entered players utility functions, resulting in predictable variations in both rejection rates and offers. However, offers were significantly more likely to ...
متن کاملInformation Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions
We examine a model in which buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. In each period, a new buyer probabilistically arrives to the market, and is endowed with a constant private value. We demonstrate by way of a simple example the inefficiency of the second-price sealed-bid auction in this setting, and therefore focus instead on the ascending auction. We th...
متن کاملEffects of Information Revelation Policies Under Cost Uncertainty
The paper presents insights regarding the key learning-related factors a buyer in a procurement context should consider when choosing the information policy, i.e., the extent to which information about bids are revealed in an auction. We offer the insights by analyzing the following two first-price sealed bid policies in a private-value sequential auction with no winner drop-outs: (i) iis: wher...
متن کاملPerfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs
We prove that every multi-player perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is...
متن کاملPerfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
Flesch et al [3] showed that, if the payoff functions are bounded and lower semicontinuous, then such a game always has a pure, subgame perfect -equilibrium for > 0. Here we prove the same result for bounded, upper semicontinuous payoffs. Moreover, Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [7] shows that if one player has a lower semicontinuous payoff and another player has an upper semicontinuous payoff,...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.995480