Effects of ad-valorem taxes on location decision under free entry Cournot oligopoly

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Economics and Business Letters

سال: 2013

ISSN: 2254-4380

DOI: 10.17811/ebl.2.1.2013.5-12