Effectiveness of performance compensation commitment under Information Inequality

نویسندگان

چکیده

The demand of information society promotes the production performance compensation commitment, which is used to alleviate asymmetry between investors and listed companies. generation commitments has reduced valuation difficulties other problems a certain extent, lowered M&A costs improved efficiency. However, as sample size increases, its drawbacks have gradually emerged. Youbo Pharmaceutical stepped on line for three consecutive years achieve accurate performance. After commitment period expires, dropped by more than 50%, so authenticity been questioned. Through analysis announcement various indicators, I find that can not bring good market reaction after period, nor it improve integration effect, even there are some behaviors such premium, goodwill impairment risk earnings management.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: E3S web of conferences

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2555-0403', '2267-1242']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123503082