Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Effective taxation of top incomes in Germany
We exploit an exhaustive administrative dataset that includes the individual tax returns of all households in the top percentile of the income distribution in Germany to pin down the effective income taxation of households with very high incomes. Taking tax base erosion into account, we find that the top percentile of the income distribution pays an effective average tax rate of 30.5 percent an...
متن کاملEffective taxation of top incomes in Germany , 1992 - 2002
We analyze the taxation of top personal incomes in Germany on the basis of an integrated data file of individual tax returns and a general household survey for the years 1992 2002. The unique feature of this integrated data set is that it includes all taxpayers in the top percentile of the gross income distribution. We show that despite substantial tax base erosion and significant reductions of...
متن کاملEffective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany , 1992 - 2002 by Stefan Bach
We analyze the taxation of top personal incomes in Germany on the basis of an integrated data file of individual tax returns and a general household survey for the years 1992 – 2002 which includes all taxpayers in the top percentile of the gross income distribution. We show that the distribution of the tax burden is highly concentrated, and that German income taxation has remained effectively p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: German Economic Review
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1468-0475,1465-6485
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.00570.x