Editorial: Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP: A Solution to the Wrong Problem?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Voting under the Qualified Majority Rule
This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of po...
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We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the ‘definitive form’ of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision ru...
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In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has led to increased interest in the allocation of voting weights to member states with hugely differing population numbers. While the eventually agreed voting scheme lacks any strict mathematical basis, the Polish government suggested a voting scheme based on the Penrose definition of voting power, leading to an allocation of voting weights pr...
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We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor–Hicks sense.We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions u...
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In this paper we propose a new voting scheme for generalizing the classical majority voting system. In contrast to the classical voting method we can make good decision if the number of classifiers assigning the correct class label is less than the half of the overall number of classifiers. This new method can be applied to such problems when the decision is not only logical but is also require...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Foreign Affairs Review
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1384-6299', '1875-8223']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021031