Economic Growth, Law, and Corruption: Evidence from India
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Comparative Economic Studies
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0888-7233,1478-3320
DOI: 10.1057/ces.2013.4