Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions∗
We develop econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders’ underlying valuations. We show that the equilibrium inverse bid functions in each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations, so that conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an i...
متن کاملEconometric Models of Ascending Auctions
We develop general econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders' underlying valuations. We show that the equilibrium inverse bid functions in each round of the auction are implicitly deened (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations, so that conditions for the existence and uniqueness ...
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The paper surveys a number of recent empirical studies that test for or evaluate the importance of asymmetric information in insurance relationships. I first discus the main conclusions reached by insurance theory in a both a static and a dynamic framework. A particular emphasis is put on the testable consequences that can be derived from existing models. I review several studies exploiting the...
متن کاملAscending Auctions
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowin...
متن کاملSimultaneous Ascending Auctions
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids promote price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Econometrics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0304-4076
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-4076(02)00199-9