Dynkin Games with Incomplete and Asymmetric Information

نویسندگان

چکیده

We study the value and optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum stopping game with incomplete asymmetric information. In our Bayesian setup, drift of underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player (incomplete information feature), but known other (asymmetric feature). formulate problem reduce it fully Markovian setup where uninformed optimises over times informed uses randomised in order hide their informational advantage. Then we provide general verification result that allows us find players’ by solving suitable quasi-variational inequalities some nonstandard constraints. Finally, an example linear payoffs, which explicit solution corresponding can be obtained.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['0364-765X', '1526-5471']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1141