Dynastic Bluff? The Road to Mielnik, 1385–1501

The Long Road to Eradicate Rinderpest

Dynastic accumulation of wealth

Why do some dynasties maintain the fortune of their founders while others completely squander it in few generations? To address this question, we use a simple deterministic microfounded model based on two main elements: the “hunger for accumulation” and the “willingness to exert effort”. Contrary to models with capital market imperfections, our setting points to the crucial role of our two key ...

To Bluff or Not to Bluff: Principles and Practice From Laboratory Experiments

Truth-telling behavior in university students (n=38) was examined using a simple stylized poker experiment. Four treatments were applied that changed either card probabilities or payoff structure. Results indicated that in some cases the students’ behavior conformed closely to theoretical predictions. However, other cases indicated robust inconsistencies between observed behavior and mixed-stra...

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games∗

A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a “dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to all players. In our model all players live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes...

Credible Communication in Dynastic Government

This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in dynastic governments. It has been suggested that “horizontal accountability,” i.e., a system of governance where cross-checking capabilities lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible information transmission. The results here suggest a cautious approach to that view. Government is modelled as a dynastic sequ...