Dynamics of a Delayed Duopoly Game with Increasing Marginal Costs and Bounded Rationality Strategy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamics of a delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality
A bounded rationality duopoly game with delay is formulated. Its dynamical evolution is analyzed. The existence of an economic equilibrium of the game is derived. The local stability analysis has been carried out. The analysis showed that firms using delayed bounded rationality have a higher chance of reaching a Nash equilibrium point. Numerical simulations were used to show bifurcation diagram...
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In this work, we investigate a time delay structure for the dynamic system of Cournot investment game played by two heterogeneous players. One player adjusts its investment decision by the locally marginal profit while the other player makes its strategy via its marginal profit with time delay. The existence and stability of equilibrium solutions is discussed. To show how the stability of this ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procedia Engineering
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1877-7058
DOI: 10.1016/j.proeng.2011.08.825