Dynamically stable matching

نویسندگان

چکیده

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic , for two‐sided matching markets where (i) opportunities arrive over time, (ii) is one‐to‐one, and (iii) irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same one must establish which allowed form blocking pairs. Second, exhibit of externality that present in static markets: an agent's payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently other contemporaneous agents' outcomes. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic necessary condition ensure timely participation economy by ensuring do strategically delay time they match.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1555-7561', '1933-6837']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4187