Dynamical Sampling with Additive Random Noise
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Random Search under Additive Noise
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Sampling Theory, Signal Processing, and Data Analysis
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2730-5716,2730-5724
DOI: 10.1007/bf03549662