منابع مشابه
Dynamic Principal Agent Models∗
This paper contributes to the theoretical and numerical analysis of discrete time dynamic principal agent problems with continuous choice sets. We first provide a new and simplified proof for the recursive reformulation of the sequential dynamic principal agent relationship. Next we prove the existence of a unique solution for the principal’s value function, which solves the dynamic programming...
متن کاملDynamic Principal-Agent Problems
We consider a continuous-time setting, in which the agent can control both the drift and the volatility of the underlying process. The principal can observe the agent’s action and can offer payment at a continuous rate, as well as a bulk payment at the end of the fixed time horizon. In examples, we show that if the principal and the agent have the same CRRA utility, or they both have (possibly ...
متن کاملAccountability and Principal-Agent Models∗
Principal-agent theory encapsulates a tradition of rational choice modeling, in which some actor(s) (the principal(s)) uses whatever actions are available, to provide incentives for some other actor(s) (the agent(s)) to make decisions that the principal most prefers. Because principal-agent theory focuses on the responsiveness of the agents decisions to the principal’s goals, and how this respo...
متن کاملAsymptotic Efficiency in Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems
In a seminal paper, B. R. Holmstro m and P. R. Milgrom (1987, Econometrica 55, 303 328) examine a principal-agent model in which the agent continuously controls the drift rate of a Brownian motion. Given a stationary environment, they show that the optimal sharing rule is a linear function of aggregated output. This paper considers a variant of the Brownian model in which control revisions take...
متن کاملDynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
We consider a general formulation of the Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on a finite horizon. Our approach is the following: we first find the contract that is optimal among those for which the agent’s value process allows a dynamic programming representation and for which the agent’s optimal effort is straightforward to find. We then show that, under technical conditions, the o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2764140