Dynamic price competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Price Competition with Switching Costs
We develop a continuous-time dynamic model of competition with switching costs to show that in a relatively simple Markov Perfect equilibrium, the dominant rm concedes market share by charging higher prices than the smaller rm. In the short-run, switching costs might have two types of anti-competitive e¤ects: rst, higher switching costs imply a slower transition to a symmetric market structu...
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The dynamic price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly when consumers value previous market shares is analyzed. The conditions for the existence of stable Markov-Perfect Equilibrium(MPE) in linear strategies are established. When they exist, the optimal pricing policies suggest that a firm with a higher previous market share charges a higher price, all else equal. It is possible...
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For many years, dynamic pricing has proven to be an effective tool to increase revenue in the airline and other service industries. Most studies, however, focused on monopolistic models and ignored the fact that nowadays consumers can easily compare prices on the Internet. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to describe real-time dynamic price competition between firms that sell su...
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Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in the short term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., two airline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisions largely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just two or three direct c...
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We analyze a simple dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition; thus it is possible t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.002