Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and No Commitment∗
This paper examines a dynamic model of nonlinear income taxation in which the government cannot commit to its future tax policy, and individuals are quasihyperbolic discounters who cannot commit to future consumption plans. The government has both paternalistic and redistributive objectives, and therefore uses its taxation powers to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that reflects i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.11.002