منابع مشابه
Dynamic Newton-Puiseux theorem
A constructive version of Newton-Puiseux theorem for computing the Puiseux expansion of algebraic curves is presented. The proof is based on a classical proof by Abhyankar. Algebraic numbers are evaluated dynamically; hence the base field need not be algebraically closed and a factorization algorithm of polynomials over the base field is not needed. The extensions obtained are a type of regular...
متن کاملDynamic Newton–Puiseux Theorem
A constructive version of Newton–Puiseux theorem for computing the Puiseux expansions of algebraic curves is presented. The proof is based on a classical proof by Abhyankar. Algebraic numbers are evaluated dynamically; hence the base field need not be algebraically closed and a factorization algorithm of polynomials over the base field is not needed. The extensions obtained are a type of regula...
متن کاملDynamic Newton–Puiseux Theorem
A constructive version of Newton–Puiseux theorem for computing the Puiseux expansions of algebraic curves is presented. The proof is based on a classical proof by Abhyankar. Algebraic numbers are evaluated dynamically; hence the base field need not be algebraically closed and a factorization algorithm of polynomials over the base field is not needed. The extensions obtained are a type of regula...
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Dynamic complexity is concerned with updating the output of a problem when the input is slightly changed. We study the dynamic complexity of model checking a fixed monadic secondorder formula over evolving subgraphs of a fixed maximal graph having bounded tree-width; here the subgraph evolves by losing or gaining edges (from the maximal graph). We show that this problem is in DynFO (with LOGSPA...
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This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilinear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extracting the agent’s “new” private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the agent’s type stochastically evolves over time, and her payoff (which is linear in transfers) depends on the ent...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Logic and Analysis
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1759-9008
DOI: 10.4115/jla.2013.5.5