Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows
This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by interactions between Linux, an open-source operating system, and Microsoft’s Windows in the computer server segment, and consequently...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0548