Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible mechanisms in environments in which the agentsprivate information evolves stochastically over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we consider are fairly general in that the agents types are allowed to evolve in a non-Markov way, decisions are allowed to a¤ect the type distributions a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1620662