منابع مشابه
Dynamic Matching in a Two-Sided Market
Motivated by the rise of the sharing economy, we consider an intermediary firm’s problem of dynamically matching demand and supply of heterogeneous types over a discrete-time horizon. More specifically, there are two finite disjoint sets of demand and supply types. Associated with each possible matching of a demand type and a supply type is a reward. In each period, demand and supply of various...
متن کاملSiqi Pan Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design
In my job market paper, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” I focus on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who ...
متن کاملA Unified Framework for Dynamic Prediction Market Design
Recently, coinciding with and perhaps driving the increased popularity of prediction markets, several novel pari-mutuel mechanisms have been developed such as the logarithmic market-scoring rule (LMSR), the cost-function formulation of market makers, utility-based markets, and the sequential convex pari-mutuel mechanism (SCPM). In this work, we present a convex optimization framework that unifi...
متن کاملMarket Integration , Matching , and Wages ¤
When it is costly for agents to ̄nd a match, integrating small markets into a large one increases the matching di±culty. We examine such dependence of the number of matches on the market size by explicitly modelling ̄rms' attempt to attract workers by posting wages. It is shown that integration reduces the relative market power of agents on the much shorter side of the market. Thus, if there ar...
متن کاملScreening in a Matching Market
Contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting. If the informed party’s reservation value does not depend on its private information (its type), it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers ‘‘low’’ types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to ‘‘high’’ types. We challenge this result by embedding contract design...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2394319