منابع مشابه
Dynamic interactive epistemology
The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133– 163] and Batt...
متن کاملHierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games1
The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players’ beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other’s conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to a fixed collection of rel...
متن کاملInteractive epistemology I: Knowledge
Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or ``player.'' One is interested not only in each person's knowledge about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge about the others' knowledge. This paper examines two parallel approaches to the subject. The ®rst is the semantic approach, in which knowledge is represented by a s...
متن کاملInteractive epistemology II: Probability
Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or ``player.'' One is interested not only in each person's knowledge and beliefs about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge and beliefs about the others' knowledge and beliefs. This paper examines two parallel approaches to the subject. The ®rst is the semantic, in which know...
متن کاملA minimal logic for interactive epistemology
I will propose a minimal logic for interactive epistemology based on a qualitative representation of epistemic individual and group attitudes including knowledge, belief, strong belief, common knowledge and common belief. I will show that the logic is sufficiently expressive to provide an epistemic foundation for various game-theoretic notions and solution concepts such as strong and weak domin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.006