Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
dynamic coloring of graph
در این پایان نامه رنگ آمیزی دینامیکی یک گراف را بیان و مطالعه می کنیم. یک –kرنگ آمیزی سره ی رأسی گراف g را رنگ آمیزی دینامیکی می نامند اگر در همسایه های هر رأس v?v(g) با درجه ی حداقل 2، حداقل 2 رنگ متفاوت ظاهر شوند. کوچکترین عدد صحیح k، به طوری که g دارای –kرنگ آمیزی دینامیکی باشد را عدد رنگی دینامیکی g می نامند و آنرا با نماد ?_2 (g) نمایش می دهند. مونت گمری حدس زده است که تمام گراف های منتظم ...
15 صفحه اولIncentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control
The paper considers two neighboring countries wishing to make a joint effort to control pollution emission. We use a differential game model that includes emission and investment in abatement technology as control variables. First, a coordinated solution that maximizes joint welfare is derived. Then we show that this outcome can be achieved as an incentive equilibrium in which each country uses...
متن کاملDynamic Incentive Mechanisms
Much of AI is concerned with the design of intelligent agents. A complementary challenge is to understand how to design “rules of encounter” (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) by which to promote simple, robust and beneficial interactions between multiple intelligent agents. This is a natural development, as AI is increasingly used for automated decision making in real-world settings. As we extend ...
متن کاملReflections on Incentive Regulation
This paper reviews in turn the papers in this Symposium on incentive regulation. It adduces the UK experience with incentive regulation, particularly in the electricity sector, to evaluate, amongst other things, the reasons for development and adoption of this approach, the determinants of setting X, and the case for more advanced metering. It suggests, among other things, that price caps can b...
متن کاملIncentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises∗
Sectors with a long regulatory tradition have recently experienced intense activity by multinationals whose international operations and relocation threats represent a new cause for concern for regulators. The present paper analyses a multinational serving two countries and being regulated by two uninformed national authorities. The firm is shown to favor, or cross-subsidize, the country with a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0095-0696
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.009