Dynamic Games With Asymmetric Information: Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and Sequential Decomposition

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

سال: 2017

ISSN: 0018-9286,1558-2523

DOI: 10.1109/tac.2016.2544936