Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information

Dynamic Games with Perfect Awareness Information

I study dynamic games where players may be unaware of some fundamentals of the game itself, such as actions or players, and such unawareness may be lifted by other players’ actions during the play. Based on Li (2006a, 2006b), I propose a framework to deal with such games using standard tools of game theory. I construct examples to show that unawareness is distinctly different from assigning zer...

Subgame Perfect Implementation With Almost Perfect Information

The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information...

Games with Perfect Information

The Folk Theorem for all Games with Almost Perfect Monitoring

We study repeated games with private monitoring. We prove the folk theorem with discounting for all games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect and the payoffs satisfy the full-dimensionality condition. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players, no public randomization, and we allow for minmax payoffs in mixed strategies.

The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring∗

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games satisfying the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.