Dynamic games in empirical industrial organization

This chapter is organized around three main topics on dynamic games in empirical IO: models, econometrics, and applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence multiplicity, describes representation this equilibrium terms conditional choice probabilities. We also discuss extensions basic including models continuous time, concepts oblivious experience-based equilibrium, where firms have non-equilibrium beliefs. In 3, we first provide an overview types data used literature, before turning to a discussion identification issues results, estimation methods. review different methods deal with multiple equilibria large state spaces, describe recent developments for estimating serially correlated unobservables, use machine learning solving games. 4 applications IO. start describing literature during early 2000s. Then, dealing innovation, antitrust mergers, pricing, regulation, product repositioning, advertising, uncertainty investment, airline network competition, matching, natural resources. conclude our view progress made remaining challenges.