Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
We consider the logical omniscience problem of epistemic logic. We argue that the problem is due to the way in which knowledge and belief are captured in Hintikka's possible worlds semantics. We describe an alternative approach in which propositions are sets of worlds, and knowledge and belief are simply a list of propositions for each agent. The problem of the circularity in the definition is ...
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This survey brings together a collection of epistemic logics and discusses their approaches in alleviating the logical omniscience problem. Of particular note is the logic of implicit and explicit belief. Explicit belief refers to information actively held by an agent, while implicit belief refers to the logical consequence of explicit belief. Ramifications of Levesque’s logic include nonstanda...
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Ž In a published paper entitled Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience: A Survey Int J . Intell Syst 1997, 12, 57]81 a collection of epistemic logics were reviewed and critiqued. This sequel paper provides evidence for the claim that a unifying framework for various existing epistemic logics can be defined. Of particular interest is the logic of implicit and explicit belief, the logic of aware...
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We propose in the paper a new solution to the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem of epistemic logic. Almost all attempts in the literature to solve this problem consist in weakening the standard epistemic systems: weaker sytems are considered where the agents do not possess the full reasoning capacities of an ideal reasoner. We shall argue that this solution is not satisfactory: in this way ...
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It is well-known that usual doxastic models (epistemic logic, probability) suffer from strong idealizations. By extension, models of decision making that elaborate on these doxastic models (e.g., models of choice under set-theoretic uncertainty ([LR85], chap.13) and the expected utility model) inherit these idealizations. To improve doxastic models is therefore an important aspect of bounded ra...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Logic and Logical Philosophy
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2300-9802,1425-3305
DOI: 10.12775/llp.2015.014