Dynamic complementarities: A quantitative analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Strategic Complementarities
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models, recommender systems, and ...
متن کاملIncremental Quantitative Analysis on Dynamic Costs
In quantitative program analysis, values are assigned to execution traces to represent a quality measure. Such analyses cover important applications, e.g. resource usage. Examining all traces is well known to be intractable and therefore traditional algorithms reason over an over-approximated set. Typically, inaccuracy arises due to inclusion of infeasible paths in this set. Thus path-sensitivi...
متن کاملQuantitative dynamic-memory analysis for Java
Spaceand time-predictability are hard to achieve for object-oriented languages with automated dynamic-memory management. Although there has been significant work to design APIs, such as the Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ), and to implement garbage collectors to enable real-time performance, quantitative space analysis is still in its infancy. This work presents the integration of a seri...
متن کاملA Quantitative Cost/Benefit Analysis for Dynamic Updating
Dynamic software updating provides many benefits, e.g. in runtime monitoring, runtime adaptation to fix bugs in long running applications, etc. Although it has several advantages, no quantitative analysis of its costs and revenue are available to show its benefits or limitations especially in comparison with other software updating schemes. To address this limitation in evaluating software upda...
متن کاملA characterization of strategic complementarities
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot bestresponse dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show: 1. That generic 2X2 ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Monetary Economics
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0304-3932
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-3932(97)00032-9