Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality
We study a firm investing in quality and building its reputation for quality. Quality can be certified at a cost. We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm’s reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification. We show that reputation-based certification has a very limited effect on incentives to inve...
متن کاملDynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality Online Appendix
Proof. Let pa ≡ sup{p ∈ [0, 1] : a(p) > 0}, pc ≡ sup{p ∈ [0, 1] : d(p,H) = 1}, τa ≡ inf{t > 0 : pt = pa, p0 = 1}, and τc ≡ inf{t > 0 : pt = pc, p0 = 1}. First, we show that in any equilibrium pa ≤ pc. Looking for a contradiction, suppose that pa > pc. Let’s consider the behavior of beliefs at the threshold pa. If a(pa) ≥ pa then λ(a(pa) − pa) ≥ 0 so beliefs never cross the threshold pa. On the ...
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15 صفحه اولReputation for Quality∗
We propose a new model of firm reputation where product quality is persistent and determined by the firm’s past investments. Reputation is then modeled directly as the market belief about quality. We analyze how investment incentives depend on the firm’s reputation and derive implications for reputational dynamics. Reputational incentives depend on the specification of market learning. When con...
متن کاملQuality, information and certification
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues in Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization related to the behavior of markets with asymmetric information. The first two chapters study the economics of credit rating agencies; the third chapter examines a process of social learning about product quality. Chapter 1 models the effect of rating agency competition on the quality ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160282