Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Seller Revelation on eBay Motors∗
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970), economists have been aware of the adverse selection problem that asymmetric information can create in durable goods markets. The success of eBay Motors, an online auction market for used cars, thus poses something of a puzzle. I argue that the key to resolving this puzzle is the auction webpage, which allows sellers to reduce information asymmetries ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.009