Dutch Book Argument in favor of Probabilism?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
James Joyce’s ‘Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’ gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person’s credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce’s argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce’s argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) hi...
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The treatment of argument realization is rather straightforward for a language like English, but for a language with relatively free word order, such as Dutch, it is a complex matter. It is not surprising then that the devices which are commonly used to deal with it show a high degree of computational complexity. They typically include movement, as in transformational grammar, or the dissociati...
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Joyce (1998) argues that for any credence function that doesn’t satisfy the probability axioms, there is another function that dominates it in terms of accuracy. But if some potential credence functions are ruled out as violations of the Principal Principle, then some non-probabilistic credence functions fail to be dominated. We argue that to fix Joyce’s argument, one must show that all epistem...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Pro-Fil
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1212-9097
DOI: 10.5817/pf15a-1-1126