Durable-goods oligopoly with secondary markets: the case of automobiles

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics

سال: 2007

ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171

DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00071.x