منابع مشابه
Price vs. Quantity in Duopoly with Strategic Delegation: Role of Network Externalities
This paper examines the implications of network externalities on equilibrium outcomes in a differentiated products duopoly under strategic managerial delegation through relative performance based incentive contracts. It shows that Miller and Pazgal (2001)'s equivalence result does not go through in the presence of network externalities. Instead, Singh and Vives (1984)'s rankings of equilibrium ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1978
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01763115