Duality in multistage games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
سال: 1968
ISSN: 0022-247X
DOI: 10.1016/0022-247x(68)90134-0