DSGE Nash: Solving Nash Games in Macro Models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian - Nash games ∗
A finite group of players (economic agents), denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}, interact. Any interaction can be represented as a simultaneous non-cooperative choice of individual plans of action.1 A set of possible decisions or choices (a set of all possible contingent plans of action) is a set of strategies. Denote Si to be a set of strategies available to player i (si ∈ Si is a generic element);...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4161296